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Economic Theory: 
Imperfect Information, Incentives, 
and the Internal Organization of Firms 
Daniel M. G.  Raff and Peter Temin 
1.1  Business History and Economists 
Traditional economic theory-that  is, economics as it has been taught to 
elementary students since World War  11-is  of  only limited use to business 
historians. Business history is about firms, and there is not much to traditional 
economic theory's firms or to the problems they confront. The structure of  the 
wants of  the consuming public is a given. So is the particular selection of 
those wants that any particular firm should try to meet. So also are the meth- 
ods by which inputs are to be combined to produce those goods. Nor are there 
any difficulties involved in getting the inputs to combine as they are meant to. 
Most firms are small with respect to the markets they trade in, and there are 
no intricate reactions or interactions between buyers, sellers, or buyers and 
sellers  together  to  be  puzzled  out  and  manipulated.  Altogether,  strategic 
choice (in both the businessman's sense and that of the game theorist) is ab- 
sent, and the details of organization are never a problem.' 
This view of the economy represents the outcome of an intellectual struggle 
almost a hundred years old. Even before World War I, economics was hardly 
a  unified  discipline.  The  contending  positions  at  that  time  can  grouped 
roughly  into two camps. The English school believed in abstract reasoning 
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and models along the lines pioneered by  Ricardo, Mill, and Marshall. The 
German school believed in inductive reasoning exemplified by  Sombart and 
Weber. 
Both schools of  thought have endured, but the English methodology cap- 
tured the seats of power within economics. German methodology survived in 
business  schools.  Economics and  management  studies both  flowered, but 
along largely independent lines. The developments, however, were not com- 
pletely parallel. For while economists could and did generally ignore schol- 
arship from business schools, the business schools could not ignore conven- 
tional economics. 
The relationship between these two strains of  thought has become more 
interactive in our generation. Business historians, firmly rooted in the partic- 
ulars of  the companies under scrutiny, have begun to hazard tentative gener- 
alizations about the best way to organize complex economic activities. Led by 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in a series of  books, some business historians have 
tried to describe the operation of an abstract entity: the modem business enter- 
prise (Chandler 1962, 1977, 1990). 
Whether by design or the result of unseen forces, economists began to think 
at approximately the same time about issues members of  the business com- 
munity and business historians would recognize as managerial. George Stig- 
ler’s famous article “The Economics of Information ,” emphasizing that infor- 
mation, like other goods, is costly and that it has consequences for decisions, 
was published virtually simultaneously with  Chandler’s Strategy and Struc- 
t~re.~  Stigler’s observation is not in  itself startling; his contribution was to 
show how the cost of information might be inserted into economic analysis. 
Treating information like another scarce good has many powerful implica- 
tions. The deepest and most significant is that economic decision-makers will 
generally not choose to acquire all the information available, any more than 
they will want to have all of any other good or service in the ec~nomy.~  They 
may not want, or even be able, to process all the information to which they do 
have access (Simon 1945, 1955). As a result, business people typically have 
to make decisions on the basis of only incomplete information. 
Institutions have emerged to facilitate decision making in the presence of 
incomplete information,  but  they  too have  problems.  Some forms of  eco- 
nomic organization constrain reactions to new information and make transac- 
tions more costly than  they would be in a simpler w~rld.~  Other forms of 
organization offer such substantial opportunities for abuse that the activities 
appear to be better undertaken without any explicit transaction or direct quid 
2. For the development of early social sciences, see Haskell(l977);  Ross (1991). 
3. Stigler ([1961] 1968). Although Stigler’s observation now seems like a commonplace even 
to economists, it struck the Nobel Committee as sufficiently momentous to be the centerpiece of 
Stigler’s Nobel prize citation in 1982. 
4. That is, information, like all other goods, is subject to diminishing returns at the margin. 
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pro quo at  Management-in  the whole breadth and variety the word con- 
veys in a business school-emerges  as an important activity. 
In fact, the functions of management are visible at many different levels of 
business enterprises. There is an isomorphism between the process of making 
decisions at the level of  hiring employees,  managing subordinate business 
units, and deciding about the extent and financing of firms as a whole. The 
recognition of  this commonality has sparked interest in the development of 
management tools and in the creation of a body of economic theory useful for 
thinking about this development.’ There is a meeting ground in this intellec- 
tual endeavor for business historians who have long been interested in the 
questions of management and economists newly attentive to these questions. 
There is also, however, a problem of communication-a  problem of  lan- 
guage. Business historians have adopted a literary style that is short on gen- 
eralizations.  Economists  employ  mathematics  that  assumes  away  details. 
These vernaculars obviously reflect the interests of the two groups. But they 
also create barriers to cross-fertilization. They promote insularity, even antag- 
onism, between the two groups of  scholars. Oliver Williamson has tried to 
bridge this gap in a series of discussions that have provided many of the terms 
that will be used here (1975,  1985). But traffic on this and other bridges has 
not been heavy as yet. 
Economists writing about these issues, for example, are fond of referring 
to principals and agents. These are abstract terms designed to identify actors 
who stand in certain relations to one another, independent of  the particular 
level or circumstances of  their relationship. The principal is the manager, 
owner, or financier who has an asset he or she wants someone else to operate. 
The agent is the worker, manager, or owner who undertakes to act on the 
principal’s behalf. The same individual may be principal in one transaction 
and agent in another. And in any given relationship both individuals, principal 
and agent alike, must be happy with the arrangement if it is to function well. 
These abstract claims represent the start of  economic analysis, but also the 
outer bounds of  traditional historians’ interest. What do these abstractions 
have to do with any specific historical incident? 
We  contend that business historians and the new  industrial organization 
theorists are looking-in  the terms of  the old story-at  different parts of  a 
common elephant. We believe that the analyses of each would benefit from a 
view of the animal as a whole. We  cannot deliver such a view in any detail in 
an introductory essay. But we can offer some examples that strongly suggest 
there is indeed a single beast under scrutiny. 
We  do this by working through a series of  historical examples that have 
6.  Coase (1937). In  his analysis the choice is in effect either to buy a service on a market from 
a stranger whom you will never see again or  to have it performed by your personal servant. The 
alternative to the open market rarely involves such an extreme of trustworthiness. The principle at 
issue is quite important, however. We  develop it at some length in section 1.2. 
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been  carefully  selected, ordered, and developed.  Many of the episodes  de- 
scribed below may well seem familiar. But the contexts in which we describe 
them and the emphases we place and questions we raise probably  will not. 
One of our objectives in laying out the material in this way is to suggest, we 
hope seductively, a set of concepts business historians might use to organize 
their data. We feel confident that if they do this, they will reap better than they 
sow. (The proof of this, in the instance of this paper, will lie in the unexpect- 
edness of our conclusions or the insights our arguments generate.) 
Another objective is to encourage historians to turn up material that econo- 
mists  will  find  anomalous or otherwise  beyond  the  scope of  their  familiar 
models.  This should  provide  grist for the theorists'  mills,  or-to  vary  the 
metaphor-grit  around which to make pearls. Such ongoing interactions, we 
feel, would be good for all parties concerned.8 
Our examples illustrate three levels of managerial decisions: organizing the 
work of  individuals,  organizing  whole production  units, and  organizing  fi- 
nance to pay for the enterprise as a whole. Our theme is that these are not in 
principle  three  disparate  or even particularly  distinct realms  at all: the one 
single logic is working itself out, again and again, with only incidental varia- 
tions. Our essay concludes with some ideas about fruitful ways of  exploring 
the meaning and relevance of these parallels in particular cases. 
1.2  Relationships with Individuals 
We begin with the most familiar vertical relationships within the firm, that 
is, with workers and the structure of the employment relation. One respect in 
which  labor-considered  as a factor of  production-is  different  from  ma- 
chines is that machines are designed to do nothing but perform some task or 
set of tasks. Once turned on, they steadily and consistently carry out the task. 
Their standard of performance  may degrade over time as parts wear.  If the 
energy supply is interrupted  or some part suffers a catastrophic failure, the 
machine may stop entirely. But the motivation of the machine to do the work 
is never at issue. Roughly speaking, machines do as they are told. They never 
shirk. They never cheat. They never pursue their own interests. 
It is not necessarily thus with people. One may think of human effort as an 
input to production and thus a good thing for the firm that employs it. But it 
is equally plausible that effort is, in the abstract, a bad thing for the employ- 
ees. All other things being equal, most people would rather work less hard 
than more. They are not willing slaves. They look out for themselves. They 
certainly prefer their leisure to what they do to earn their living. This is why 
8. For example, the economists' recent inside-the-firm and imperfect-competition literatures 
appear to have developed in isolation from one another. It is plausible that the solutions to the two 
problems might be connected in interesting ways. (For a hint, see Bernheim and Whinston 1985.) 
The theorists do not seem to know quite where to start in exploring this systematically (see Tirole 
1988, 50-51).  Historians could play a useful agenda-setting role by  identifying and exploring a 
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they are paid to do their work. They have their own preferences, and these are 
often not the same as those of their employers. 
All  this  may  seem obvious.  But  it  develops  interesting and  sometimes 
subtle ramifications when it is costly for the employee’s manager to know how 
well the employee’s tasks have been executed and how diligently the employ- 
ee’s responsibilities have been executed. It may well be true that the workers 
on Henry Ford’s assembly line-made  vivid for us all in Chaplin’s Modern 
Times-had  very little scope for this sort of ~hirking.~  But that was due to the 
experimental and  self-consciously radical division of  labor at Ford,  which 
produced jobs of a degree of  simplicity and monitorability unknown even in 
Ford’s own industry today. Most production jobs in the economy then and now 
are not like that. Few managerial jobs have ever been. Generally speaking, 
where there is a job there is an agency problem. 
The simplest example with which to begin analyzing agency problems and 
the significance of  their solutions has been  famous to economists from the 
days of  Marshall’s Principles. The subject is agricultural tenants who pay no 
set fee for the use of  the land they farm, but instead give to the landlord a 
predetermined share of what they grow. Marshall writes that 
when the cultivator has to give to his landlord half of the returns to each 
dose of  capital and labor that he applies to the land, it will not be in his 
interest to  apply  any doses  the  total return  to  which  is less than twice 
enough to reward him. If. . . he is free to cultivate as he chooses, he will 
cultivate less intensively than [under a pure rental system]; he will apply 
only so much capital and labor as will give him returns more than twice 
enough to repay himself; so that his landlord will get a smaller share even 
of those returns than he would have on the plan of a fixed payment. (1961, 
644) 
The situation is that the landlord cannot work the land himself and needs to 
find someone else to do it for him. He is a principal in search of an agent. Yet 
he cannot continually stand over the agent, telling him how hard to work, how 
much fertilizer to apply, and so forth. The landlord-the  principal-must  em- 
ploy a tenant-the  agent-whose  day-to-day actions he cannot observe and 
on whose day-to-day actions he depends for his income. 
All is not lost for the landlord, however. The agent’s inputs into the produc- 
tion process cannot be observed. But the process outputs can be observed, 
and, in Marshall’s story, can be observed costlessly. The story is phrased in 
terms of a single period (one growing season, say). So the contract is set in 
terms of  shares of  the output-the  harvest-at  the end of  the season. The 
problem is that the tenant,  who gets to act independently once the period 
starts, will not want to invest as much of  his energies and his wealth as the 
landlord would wish. The landlord will get something, but his asset will be 
underemployed. 
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The tenant will make his decisions on the basis of his benefits and costs, 
and so ultimately on the prices and returns to effort that confront him. Only 
when the tenant’s marginal incentives are the same as the owner’s will the two 
want to make the same decisions.  Only when both of  these are undistorted 
will these decisions be the correct ones. The way  for the landlord to bring 
about this desirable coordinated state of affairs (to get his asset exploited in an 
efficient way) is to charge the tenant a fixed rent for the use of the land, leaving 
the tenant free to capture all the marginal gains to investment and enterprise. 
The efficient contract sets the level of the rent so as to extract all the (expected) 
profits  without undesirably  distorting  the tenant’s decision making (Cheung 
1969). 
Marshall was interested in the divergent returns facing the two contracting 
parties. To focus on this, he set up his model abstracting away from almost all 
details of the common actual situation.  In particular, he omitted some other 
important  respects  in  which  conflicts between  the  tenant  and the  landlord 
could appear. In the most obvious instance, he assumed-casually  as it might 
seem-that  both agent and principal knew exactly how much output there was 
to divide. However much output there was, it was with absolute certainty to 
be divided according to the initially agreed-upon rule. We now make the prob- 
lem more complex by varying that assumption. 
Consider instead what happens if the tenant can hide the results of a good 
year. (Consider, that is, what happens when the deterministic relationship be- 
tween the farmer’s effort and the size of  the crop becomes uncertain and hard 
to verify.)l0 We  focus on the verification  problem.  The tenant might think 
that, since he works the land while the landlord sits by,  he is entitled to the 
benefits of  good rainfall. In the manner of taxpayers everywhere, he might not 
declare the whole of his output. The landlord, lacking accurate information, 
is at a disadvantage. 
The extent of the landlord’s vulnerability to self-serving underreporting de- 
pends upon the amount of uncertainty  in the harvest. If  harvests do not vary 
much from year to year, it will be difficult for the tenant to conceal very much: 
the landlord will have a fairly precise idea how big a harvest to expect. But if 
harvests vary a lot from year to year, then the opportunity for fraud is present. 
In this context, partial payment creates a further wedge between the moti- 
vation of tenant and landlord. Just as in Marshall’s original example, the shar- 
ing scheme creates inefficiencies. In this context, partial payment creates a 
new problem as well. How is the landlord to convince the tenant to be honest 
about his crop? He may need to break out of the simple share contract that 
Marshall described and design a new way of monitoring his tenant. 
Marshall’s assumption  about the availability-more  precisely, the relative 
10. This situation has been explored systematically by Stiglitz (1974). 
11. Most of  the literature of  the economic theory of  agency focuses on the uncertainty  and 
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costs-of  different kinds of information was extreme. Once we get away from 
this,  it becomes obvious that a landlord actually has many options open to 
him. He need not confine his attention to the output itself, but may look also 
at the acreage planted, the effort expended by his tenant, the materials used.12 
Each of  these alternatives, of course, may  be observable only with error as 
well. The landlord consequently has to compare the costs and the ultimate 
benefits of informing himself by different means. 
Each of the landlord’s alternatives creates a different incentive for the ten- 
ant. Faced with an output test, the tenant may hide his crop. Faced with a land 
or labor observation, he may sham working in order to fool the landlord. In 
this case, he is actually expending effort fooling the landlord that would be 
better spent farming. Monitoring schemes can do more than set up suboptimal 
incentives; they can set up perverse incentives. 
This is peculiarly the case when long time periods are involved. Marshall 
considers only the yearly crop of  the tenant farmer. But let us consider the 
incentives of the tenant to improve his land, by improving drainage or repair- 
ing buildings. The investment could be substantial, and the returns might only 
come over a long stretch of years. 
If  the tenant has only a yearly contract, he may not have any incentive to 
engage in a long-term investment. What is to keep the landlord from evicting 
him just  as the improvements begin  to improve the yield? How  can he  be 
assured of enjoying the fruits of his labor even in this indirect way? 
There are again many options. The landlord might require improvements as 
part of  the yearly contract. He could, under certain circumstances, offer the 
tenant a long-term lease.  I3 He might pay the tenant at the time of investment 
for the time and materials used to upgrade the irrigation system or buildings. 
Each of  these alternatives, as before, has its costs to the landlord and incen- 
tives for the tenant. Both aspects need to be considered in choosing or evalu- 
ating a contract. 
These considerations apply as well to the development of  human capital. 
Stepping outside Marshall’s farming example, an employer may want her em- 
ployees to engage in self-improvement. She may want her workers to engage 
in activities that will bring returns to the company only after several years. 
The timing problem is exactly the same as the landlord-tenant problem with 
fixed capital. But the intensity of effort and the effects of education are harder 
to observe than the repair of buildings. The problem, in other words, is doubly 
difficult. The activities in the present are hard to observe, and the results of 
these actions come only in the future. 
12. Levinthal (1988) identifies and analyzes three distinct strategies for reducing these agency 
costs. They are improved accounting (i.e.,  measurement), long-term contracts between principal 
and agent, and competition among agents (i.e.,  rank-order compensation). There are business- 
history examples of each of these in our text and in the other papers in this volume. 
13. This, to draw out the point of the preceding footnote, is an  example of  moving towards the 
first-best by  developing a long-term relationship between principal and agent that allows future 
rewards for present good behavior. We explore this option further below. 14  Daniel M. G.  Raff and Peter Temin 
Any owner therefore faces a problem of motivating his or her employees or 
agents. This problem is most intense when uncertainty is high, monitoring is 
expensive, and observable outcomes are delayed. It is the function of manag- 
ers-the  modem counterparts to Marshall’s landowner-to  design compen- 
sation schemes that are appropriate to the particular structure of  costs and 
incentives faced by the various parties engaged in production. 
One historic pattern  in compensation schemes for blue-collar employees 
exposes the result of this kind of managerial design. It is a particularly inter- 
esting example because the sort of  systematic, explicit reasoning about costs 
and alternatives we have been developing explains coherently a set of institu- 
tions that otherwise seem entirely capricious. 
The story begins with a puzzling fact. There were many manufacturing 
firms circa 1900 that employed both men and women. The men were far more 
likely to be paid via time rates and the women by piece rates than vice versa. 
Why should this have been so? 
It emerges upon investigation that the bulk of  the jobs in question posed 
monitoring and incentive problems of the sorts outlined above.  l4  When output 
is easily measurable, as it tended to be in these jobs, a formally simple solu- 
tion to the shirking problem is to pay by piece rates and simply monitor out- 
put.15 This links compensation to effort in a fairly direct way.  It typically is a 
lot cheaper than intensive monitoring of the effort inputs. The problem is that 
piece-rate schemes are nonetheless costly to administer. Someone has to count 
the output. 
We  have a conflict here. The obvious way to respond to the difference be- 
tween workers’ and managers’ objectives creates administrative costs. Man- 
agers naturally would prefer to solve the incentive problem without incurring 
large costs.  One alternative was to pay  time rates rising over time and to 
pose-through  periodic spot-checks of  various sorts-some  threat of  firing 
before the rates had risen as high as they eventually would. The employer, in 
other words, offered deferred compensation for hard work. Monitoring would 
be spread out over a long time, reducing its cost. It  might even be done by 
evaluating relative performance,  further reducing the expense.  l6  The rising 
pay scale would provide a way of motivating each hour of work without mon- 
itoring each item produced. 
This might seem to suggest that all employees would be paid on the same 
scheme. But that would follow only if all employees could offer a long-term 
14. Goldin (1986) gives facts and a detailed analysis. 
15. It is characteristic of the sort of jobs we are discussing, as it is of all jobs implicitly de- 
scribed in the economists’ literature on compensation schemes, that the more output any particular 
worker produces, the better off  the employer is. When outputs are complementary, this may not 
be not so. In that case, when workers produce output in an unsynchronized way,  downstream 
employees, capital, and work in process will stand idle. This is wasteful and may be very expen- 
sive (see Raff 1988). 
16. We assume that workers do not collude. Allowing worker solidarity introduces another level 
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relationship to the firm in which the incentive of deferred compensation would 
have some meaning. Women were systematically different from men in this 
regard. Their employment was affected by changes in their marital status and 
by childbearing: at the turn of the century, women were in and out of employ- 
ment due to the biological and  social impacts of  reproduction. A deferred 
compensation scheme did not provide a way to motivate effort on the job for 
most women because most women would leave a job before the full bargain 
could be played out. Managers therefore used  a rising time-rate pay  scale 
when they could-with  typical male employees-and  more costly piece rates 
when they could not. The observed gender difference in pay modes was the 
result.” 
A similar story, with interesting additional elements, can be told about the 
new executive bonus scheme introduced in the General Motors Corporation 
by  Alfred Sloan in 1923. The basic problem and the basic solution idea will 
be familiar. The motivational mismatch Sloan confronted derives from the 
existence of  firm-specific (or, more generally, transaction-specific) assets. 
The  assets  in  question  are individuals’ knowledge specific to a  particular 
firm’s operations and markets. Just as Marshall’s landlord wanted tenants to 
use the land and Goldin’s managers wanted workers to expend their effort, 
Sloan sought to induce managers to exploit these assets for GM’s benefit. The 
question to bear in mind is how the mismatch between GM’s and the manag- 
ers’ interests might best be accommodated, given that the mismatch problem 
cannot simply be wished away. 
The salient facts are as follows.  l9  GM had been operated as a holding com- 
pany for some time. Roughly from its inception through the end of the war, 
executives had been paid salaries plus bonuses that were related to the per- 
formance of  their particular division of  the corporation. This naturally en- 
couraged them to make their decisions with principal reference to the fortunes 
of their own division. There were circumstances, however, in which such de- 
cisions might undermine the prosperity of the corporation as a whole. 
The first revision of  this scheme was, then, to relate bonuses to corporate 
rather than divisional performance and to pay them out only when corporate 
performance was above a stated acceptable minimum. But the compensation 
still remained entirely a current transaction. 
Excessive inventory commitments coincided with a downswing in the busi- 
ness cycle in 1920. The viability of the corporation as a whole was threatened, 
albeit briefly. Sloan’s solution to this problem was to create a centralized cor- 
porate staff to plan and coordinate financial commitments and long-term in- 
vestments. He created this staff and began to reorganize the way  GM con- 
17. Discrimination,  of course, may provide another explanation.  See Lazear (1979) for a differ- 
18. Becker developed these ideas in his “Investment in Human Capital” (1962). We develop the 
19. This account follows Sloan (1964). 
ent implication of the possibility of long-term contracts. 
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ducted its business to bring long-run planning into the forefront of managerial 
consideration. The creation of a corporate staff was crucial to the process, but 
the staff had to be motivated to place GM’s interests first. Sloan implemented 
a significant change to the bonus scheme to solve this problem. 
The change involved setting up the Managers Security Company. The Du 
Pont company, then and for many years thereafter the largest single share- 
holder in GM, made a large block of  shares available for sale to this new 
entity. The Managers Security Company was, from time to time and as exec- 
utive performances dictated, to makes its own shares available for sale to the 
corporate executives.  Inducing the  managers to  hold  their  wealth  in GM 
equity would in itself have given them the sort of longer-term interest in over- 
all  corporate performance  the  shareholders had.  But  Sloan produced  two 
twists that made this much more pronounced. The executives bought the stock 
on margin: they paid only a fraction of the market value of the shares up front 
and paid off  the rest over time. They agreed to pay off  the balance through 
future bonuses they might earn. And the shares they purchased, though these 
had all the attributes of ordinary GM shares, were not in fact tradable assets. 
There were not even procedures in place for managers to voluntarily sell out 
their positions. In short, the investment was on generous terms. But it could 
only be liquidated with the approval and assistance of GM.20 
The reorganization plan created a group of tasks whose successful execu- 
tion would be crucial to the corporation’s short-term viability and long-term 
success. The jobs involved some novelty, considerable difficulty, substantial 
monitoring problems, and very long-term consequences for the shareholders. 
Sloan’s 1923 plan gave those who were in a position to carry the tasks out a 
pronounced long-term interest in seeing to it that the return on invested capital 
exceeded what the shareholders regarded as an acceptable minimum. 
From the perspective of  Marshall’s landlord, experienced tenant farmers 
from a given region were probably more or less perfect substitutes. From the 
perspective of the owners of GM, there were no outside perfect substitutes for 
these men who came to know much more than anyone else did about the im- 
portant novelties of running the GM business. As one might therefore expect, 
participation in the plan was not open to all employees of  the corporation or 
even to all executives. It was restricted to “top” executives who were expected 
to see out their careers with the firm. When Sloan spoke later in the decade of 
the scheme, with pride, as having created more than a few millionaires, it 
seems clear that the main group of employees he had in mind were these sen- 
ior members of  the corporate staff.21  By  comparison, individual blue-collar 
20. Even John Raskob, a top GM official who had been for many years previously a senior and 
trusted officer at Du Pont, discovered this when he wanted to leave GM in 1928. He owned nearly 
$20 million of the nontraded Managers Security Company shares and had to write, formally and 
as supplicant, to get these turned into securities he could trade on a market (sze Kuhn 1986, 163). 
21. It is an interesting but separate question whether it was efficient to offer the possibility of 
wealth on this scale. 17  Business History and Recent Economic Theory 
employees had nothing unusual to offer the company. They had no long-lived 
and difficult-to-replace productive asset, and they could offer no services the 
corporation could not obtain competitively elsewhere.22  Unless their coopera- 
tion became in itself an important asset, the corporation had no reason to pay 
them any more than the best they could earn elsewhere. Until that came about, 
though  the company prospered, employees were  not  particularly  well  paid 
even within their industry. When it came about, both relationships changed.23 
These two examples show the principal-agent  problem  in a simple form. 
The principals  are the employers; the agents, employees at different levels. 
The problem in each case was what economists call “shirking.” This may have 
been actual shirking in the case of  factory pieceworkers. The term, however, 
is used to refer to any divergence of interest between the principal and agent. 
In the case of  GM, Sloan was not trying to make his managers work harder. 
He was trying to align their incentives with the enterprise’s objectives. “Shirk- 
ing” in this context means playing for your own or your own division’s gain, 
not the corporation’s. 
1.3  Relationships with Groups 
Our discussion thus far has focused on relations between ownerimanagers 
and single employees, that is, on the simplest sorts of organizations. But the 
sorts of considerations we highlighted also bear on optimal designs for com- 
plex organizations. They can be observed at work  in historical evolution of 
such designs, and they can be used to assess the wisdom of particular  deci- 
sions effecting organizational change (see Chandler 1977). 
Expanding our horizons adds additional dimensions to the decisions under 
study. For the issue is not simply how to align incentives between  principal 
and agent, but  also whether to  use  an agent at all. We  assumed in the last 
section that the decision to hire farmers, workers, and managers had already 
been made. Here we ask also whether activities should be structured within 
the business enterprise or belong to the relations between firms. 
The limits of  the firm can be explored  in two dimensions: horizontal  and 
vertical.  Horizontal  integration  refers to the  inclusion of  many  similar ele- 
ments in a single enterprise. Vertical integration refers to the inclusion of dif- 
ferent  stages of  production  within  a firm: the “make or buy” decision. We 
provide two examples of  each in turn. 
In each case, one example is historical and illustrates the growth or restruc- 
turing of a large corporation. The other example is drawn from more recent 
22. One sees the same sort of concerns at work in the structure of compensation contract in 
start-up companies backed by  venture capitalists. (See Raff and Crocombe 1989.) Managers car- 
rying heavy and difficult-to-monitor responsibilities are paid relatively heavily, and sometimes 
even predominantly, in shares and options. Managers in more routine jobs are not. 
23. For  evidence that this was in  fact what the corporation did, see Raff  (1989, section 4). 
Presumably the same obtained  for lower-level managers.  No data seem to have  survived with 
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experience and explores the way  in which some firms relinquish activities. 
Since business history is so often the history of  successful enterprises,  we 
have to draw on recent experience for examples of companies that are,  in 
some sense, too big. 
Around the turn of the century, it became common to find manufacturing 
firms that were horizontal conglomerates. The enterprises these corporations 
owned were diverse as well as complex. Furthermore, the performance of the 
several component parts was interrelated, not least because there was a com- 
mon  pool of  capital and a common credit rating.  Since generally speaking 
there are limits to information-processing capacity, this meant that the owners 
of the firm and even the managers were in roughly the same situation as Mar- 
shall’s landowners: they couldn’t know as much as they would like-and  be 
able to monitor as well as they would wish-all  the operational decision- 
makers.24  So whatever the advantages, easily realized or merely potential, be- 
hind the new, broader grouping, it posed serious problems of control and mo- 
tivation. 
The common form of organization appropriate to simpler organizations was 
strictly functional. There was a division responsible for engineering (i.e., de- 
sign of products and manufacturing processes), for manufacturing, for sales, 
and for finance (i.e., raising working and investment capital). So long as the 
shareholders-or  at least the top managers-grasped  all the major details of 
the business and the operating circumstances, it was possible for them to as- 
sess directly how well all the employees were doing their jobs and to reward 
them in a way that motivated them to continue or improve as appropriate. 
Once the operations grew diverse and complicated, this ceased being pos- 
sible. In particular, it became extremely difficult to tell whether corporate re- 
sources were being used efficiently. Not very much information was available 
to top managers and shareholders. The information they could easily obtain 
had too little structure to be  very  useful. For example,  suppose one could 
actually assess on some absolute scales the average quality of  the perform- 
ances of  the engineering group and that of  the marketing group. How were 
they to be weighted against one another in a way  that gave their employees 
helpful incentives? 
All  this became very obvious to the owners of  GM during the inventory 
crisis of  1920 to which we  have referred above. The organization they had 
invested in so heavily was a sort of holding company of divisions rather than 
a unitary functionally organized entity (see Williamson 1975, 143-44).  But 
24. This situation was exacerbated by the absence of helpful accounting conventions and, until 
the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934, of any statutory obligation to publish even 
annual balance sheets. There was, of course, some incentive to publish some accounting infor- 
mation in hopes of attracting investors. The scale of fraud in such matters in the 1920s suggests 
the potential for moral hazard in this situation. 
Roe  (1990) discusses how various legal changes in the 1930s discouraged active shareholder 
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its divisions were uncoordinated, undirected, and scarcely monitored.  There 
was no systematic financial reporting. Many factory managers were in a po- 
sition to commit the firm’s resources to capital and materials expenditure- 
indeed,  even  to  executive compensation-without  any  sort  of  real  coor- 
dination or control. When the depression of  1920 struck, the firm was badly 
overextended. When the new owners wanted to rationalize resource use, they 
found they had very little appropriate and usable data. 
The solution  put forward  was  to restructure operations  and information 
flows so that the firm became tautly divisionalized.  That is, it became a col- 
lection of divisions, each with its own products, organized  internally  along 
functional  lines,  and substantially  self-contained, all  formally as before- 
save for finance. There would be a sort of  internal capital market to carry out 
and monitor resource allocation, and a corporate staff  was created with the 
main tasks of performing the monitoring (via regular and frequent calculations 
of return on corporate investment  in the individual entities) and of planning 
long-term competitive strategy (i.e., making decisions that implicated future 
investment plans). Divisional managers were responsible for groups of  oper- 
ations that they could understand and assess. Now their own performance was 
given  a  common scale (Johnson  and  Kaplan  1987, 93-123),  and  the GM 
stockholders (or at least those acting in their stead) could compare the per- 
formance of  Chevrolet and Oldsmobile managers, rewarding  the  managers 
and allocating capital appropriately. 
All this raises an intriguing question. William C. Durant has often casually 
been  said to have bequeathed  this  slack divisional  form to GM because he 
liked buying companies but was uninterested  in running them. After all, in- 
cumbent management was perfectly  happy  to continue doing that. Perhaps 
this was indeed Durant’s psychological  quirk. But he was an active investor. 
Du Pont bought into GM as a passive investment. The Du Pont executives do 
not appear to have valued the investment in terms of the personal satisfaction 
that interfering  in GM’s affairs might yield.  Why then did it  make sense for 
them to keep all these operations grouped together in a single giant enterprise? 
Why did they not seek to break up GM and select which units of the business 
they wished to own or control? 
Horizontal  disintegration  would  have  offered an opportunity to shed risk 
specific to GM and its particular businesses. The du Ponts and their colleagues 
might  have preferred a more diversified portfolio of  investments.  And they 
always  could replicate  the pattern  of  the risks  and returns  offered  by  their 
original GM interests by buying and selling shares of  the disintegrated  com- 
ponent companies on a competitive securities market. By keeping GM uni- 
tary, they constrained themselves to owning a controlling  interest in all the 
subsidiary auto companies. ‘They forswore the advantages of making individ- 
ual investment decisions in order-we  presume-to  take advantage of  other 
opportunities. 
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in a structured way. Suppose we start from the assumption that investors want 
in some general sense to maximize the return on their in~estment.~~  It is then 
natural to infer that the Du Pont group felt a strategy of horizontal disintegra- 
tion would not realize the same value. Why might this have been? On the one 
hand, perhaps there were simply limits to abilities of the mass of Wall Street 
investors to understand the value of  individual firms’ long-term investment 
programs. This does not seem a strong argument, at least on a priori grounds: 
why should their analytical skills and those of  their advisors have been dra- 
matically less good than those of the du Ponts’ private investment advisors? 
On the other hand, it is plausible to suspect that the Du  Pont group saw or 
expected to realize economies of scope from joint operation (see Raff  1989). 
They thought that the sort of managerial skills and discipline required to run 
a large, complex manufacturing enterprise were scarce (that is, that the right 
sort of managers were a scarce resource), that they possessed on their staff in 
Wilmington some of the right sort of managers, and that they could use their 
influence in the GM boardroom to move these managers into GM.26  Perhaps, 
that is, they had reasons for believing their employees would run the compa- 
nies more efficiently than those who would otherwise do 
Issues of control at the plant level are more complex than at the individual 
level. In addition to the principal-agent problems discussed above, problems 
of  synergy  also  arise.  It  is  only  worth  designing  appropriate  incentive 
schemes, after all, if there are benefits to be reaped from joint activity.**  The 
problems of principles and agents need to be placed in the context of control 
over specific assets. 
The recent experiences of the Canadian entrepreneur Robert Campeau seem 
to expose, at least in the short run, the costs of joint operation. Campeau came 
to public attention as a man who had made a considerable fortune in real estate 
development. He also had established a beachhead in retailing.29  He observed 
that a number of  major American department store chains were up for sale 
through  the  sale of  their  holding company,  Federated Department Stores. 
There were many common suppliers among these retail outlets. (In fact, there 
were even a considerable number of common products offered for sale.) The 
marketing strategies of the stores were in some cases competitive where head- 
on competition did not seek to maximize joint profits. Each chain also paid 
considerable sums for overhead expenses duplicated at every other division. 
Given the tax code,  many of  the individual stores were sitting on land that 
would be more valuable to other owners. Campeau also saw profit opportuni- 
25. This seems historically apt. Consider the account of the Du Pont board’s discussion of  the 
26. Again, see ibid. 
27. Appropriate compensation was needed, of  course, to induce these managers to perform. 
28. The benefits, of course, need to be net of any costs. 
29. The most notable vehicle for the presence in retailing was Campeau’s purchase of the Allied 
initial GM investment in Chandler and Salsbury (1971). 
This was discussed in section 1.2. 
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ties in malls. Once the Campeau Corporation added the Federated group to its 
Allied Stores, it would control a large fraction of the department store chains 
prominent enough to anchor suburban malls. Campeau hoped to use this po- 
sition to extract equity from mall owners and to obtain more favorable rental 
terms. 
It is characteristic of several of these items that the incentives facing man- 
agers of  the isolated stores or groups of  stores would lead to less profitable 
plans than would the incentives facing the managers of the whole. Joint profits 
would be higher if  actions could be coordinated and centralized than if they 
were designed independently and competitively. 
Most of these sorts of economies were increasing in the size of the venture. 
Campeau was a wealthy man, but his resources certainly would not stretch to 
simply buying Federated out of pocket. The American financial markets had 
recently become amenable to buying bonds issued to finance such transac- 
tions, providing another avenue toward  unified  operations. Campeau could 
buy the stores at a price greater than they were worth to their current owners 
(as they currently understood how to run the business) if he could borrow the 
money. This would, of course, commit him to regular payments to the lenders. 
The idea was to finance these payments out of the increased profits from the 
realized economies of common management. 
Campeau attempted to buy the stores in 1988. He got involved in a bidding 
war. He did in the end succeed in purchasing the stores, but as a result of the 
bidding he paid a hefty price. His ability to meet the coupon on the bonds sold 
to cover this price turned on two factors. The first was that gross sales for the 
group would continue to increase at something like 5 percent per annum. The 
second was that the forecast economies of overhead reduction and economies 
of  superior purchasing and planning procedures could be realized essentially 
immediately. 
It appears that Campeau’s calculations of  the value and cash flows of  the 
conglomerate firm-which  were the ultimate basis of  the price Campeau of- 
fered and the interest he was prepared to pay-estimated  these joint econo- 
mies without analyzing precisely how and when they would be generated. The 
most striking example is informational. The different department store chains 
each had idiosyncratic management information (i.e., computer control) sys- 
tems. Configuring these to give top management integrated data on invento- 
ries and  sales at the level of detail needed to bargain with  suppliers was a 
project of  massive proportions. The economies would be unavailable in the 
absence of  such an  investment in the infrastructure of  information.  Under 
pressure for short-term cash, Campeau instead squeezed the relevant budgets. 
His managers consequently were preoccupied with  short-run survival, not 
long-run investments in information retrieval. Unsurprisingly, the economies 
that might have followed from common ordering were not rapidly forthcom- 
ing. Other projected overhead economies seem to have been equally unrealiz- 
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In the fall of  1989, the Campeau Corporation was in the news again. First 
cash  flow  problems were rumored.  Then some of  the company’s suppliers 
expressed hesitation at extending trade credit. This was an extremely serious 
threat, given that  the goods in question were for the Christmas trade.  For 
department  stores,  the  months  preceding  Christmas  are  the  most  sales- 
extensive period of  the year. For a store to run out of  money and therefore 
trade credit and therefore goods to sell in  this period would spell complete 
commercial disaster. 
Federated had initially been a profitable going concern. If  it had remained 
independent, its managers would have taken care to have the cash and credit 
for Christmas, anticipating the familiar yearly cycle. As part of the Campeau 
firm, however, the Federated cash could be taken for other purposes. Cam- 
peau, optimistic about realizing the scale economies, took the cash to pay the 
interest on his bonds. He left the stores and their managers in the lurch. Alas, 
they lurched back at him. 
Sales growth, always uncertain, emerged distinctly lower than expected, as 
the economy proved sluggish in 1989. There were no substantial cost reduc- 
tions to cushion the blow.  (Operations did not get more expensive, but they 
did not get cheaper as fast as Campeau and his bankers had been counting on.) 
The real estate deals contemplated were complex and required careful negoti- 
ation, and the whole project fell apart long before any opportunities arose to 
exploit the undervalued real estate. The point of  the Campeau story, at least 
up to its moment of crisis, is that the existence of horizontal scope economies 
does not mean that their extent is unlimited or their timing wholly flexible. 
Abstract incentives are not everything: it only makes sense to talk about incen- 
tives in a particular informational context. Information, as we have stressed, 
is available only at a cost. In this case, it would take a considerable investment 
in order to make the cost manageable. Given the price Campeau had to pay, 
the optimal horizontal boundaries of a retailing firm were not obviously larger 
than those of  Allied or Federated Department Stores, the economies of joint 
operations and assets notwithstanding. 
Unlike the GM example, Campeau’s experience appears to reveal the ab- 
sence of incentives to integrate horizontally. We  turn now to the problem of 
vertical integration, where we pose the same sorts of questions. 
Firms constantly face the “make or buy” decision. Needing various prod- 
ucts as inputs or various services as aids to merchandising, firms have to de- 
cide whether to purchase them in  the market or produce them themselves. 
There are distinctive features in each case, of course. But the general problem 
is obvious. Any business person needs to have a source of supply of inputs to 
his or her productive process. (He or she also needs outlets, and the problem 
is symmetrical for “upstream” and “downstream” transactions.) It often makes 
sense to rely on the market for these inputs. But there are conditions under 
which the market does not work well. In such a case, it makes sense to make 
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As in the previous examples, these conditions feature uncertainty in a cen- 
tral role. Information is incomplete, and private incentives may be divergent 
in uncertain  conditions. Vertical  integration  involves transactions  whose ef- 
fects will be realized only over time, and so involve some ex ante uncertainty, 
just as in the examples of employees at the turn of the century and department 
stores now. Vertical integration also involves assets specific to the transactions 
in question, as in the example of GM’s management incentives. 
The modem economist’s theory of vertical integration has as its centerpiece 
a concept  of  idiosyncratic  assets, that  is, assets whose uses  are specific to 
certain transactions. A careful definition may be helpful. An asset is said to 
be transaction-specific to the extent it has lower value in any other use (Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian  1978). As we argued above, for example, long-time 
top managers have skills and knowledge specific to their companies and jobs, 
while relatively unskilled workers do not. This distinction turns out to make 
equally incisive sense applied to inanimate assets.30 
If production costs would be increased by forgoing the use of a transaction- 
specific asset with one or the other of these attributes, then the owner of  the 
specific asset acquires power.  When there are many people involved, this is 
called market power. When  there are only a few, it often is termed hold-up 
power.  Given the durable nature of the asset, this power could be exploited 
opportunistically once the capital was in use. To avoid such a state of affairs, 
the buyer of  the services of  the specialized asset would have to have a com- 
plete contract, that is, one in which provisions had been made for all conceiv- 
able eventualities.  It is very difficult and expensive to write such contracts. 
People cannot process all the information needed to formulate such a docu- 
ment in an uncertain  world. And even if they could, the time needed to write 
it, negotiate  it, and-if  need be-contest  it after the fact would be horren- 
dous. When the use of a specific asset is indicated, therefore,  some sort of 
integration is indi~ated.~’ 
Chandler’s celebrated account of  Swift’s successful introduction of central- 
ized modem meat packing illustrates the main point vividly. Before the 1880s 
30. Three distinct kinds of physical asset specificity have been  identified by  Williamson (see 
Williamson  1985, 95-96).  The first is  locational. The second is the ex ante specificity of  the 
purpose-built capital good. The final type includes those assets that do not have any unique aspects 
ex ante, but that become dedicated to a particular use. (It will be noted that these categories are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.) 
3 I. Statistical tests have confirmed the relationship between transaction specificity of assets and 
various forms of vertical integration. Monteverde and Teece (1982) report that automobile com- 
panies were more likely to integraie backward into the production of components if engineering 
was important or if the item was made by a single supplier. Masten (1984) discovered that aero- 
space components  were more likely to be made internally if they were highly specialized and 
complex. Joskow (1985) found that vertical integration between electric utilities and coal mines 
was much more likely for mine-mouth generating plants than for others. In each case, variables 
indexing transaction specificity significantly affected the decision whether to obtain the desired 
products through the market or internally. These three examples illustrate the importance of hu- 
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fresh meat went east “on the hoof.” Animals were shipped live to local slaugh- 
terhouses and sold fresh to urban consumers. The animals’ rail journey was 
stressful and resulted in massive losses of weight. There was a clear gain to 
be had if some way could be discovered to supply fresh meat without shipping 
live animals. 
The modem refrigerated railroad car was invented in 188  1  .32 This made it 
possible to slaughter animals in the West-that  is, Chicago-and  ship the 
meat east. But how  was the transition to centralized packing to take place? 
Would there be market transactions? Would railroads sell refrigerated freight 
services to  meat  packers  or  shippers?  Would  Chicago  meat  packers  sell 
dressed meat to wholesalers who would transport and sell it in the East? 
The refrigerated freight car in the early 1880s was designed to carry perish- 
able goods, and it was in addition the only way to transport such goods from 
Chicago to New York or Boston. It was an asset specific to this sort of trans- 
action. It was of markedly less value in any other use, and the cost of shipping 
dressed meat was higher-much  higher-by  any other facility. 
How would a market for refrigerated freight services have worked under 
these conditions? The answer clearly is badly. The railroads had only minor 
interest in Swift’s business; they had many, many other customers to consider. 
Given the transaction-specificity  of refrigerated cars, a market in their services 
would have been a bilateral monopoly. There would have been ample scope 
for bargaining, exploitation, and double-crossing on both sides. Potential en- 
trants into either the refrigerated freight market or the meat-packing business 
would have been able to anticipate these problems. They would have been 
discouraged from entering. Even if  the potential for bad bargains could have 
been eliminated by a contract or understanding, the cost of negotiating a suit- 
able arrangement would have been daunting. 
Swift’s innovation was to create an integrated enterprise that both slaugh- 
tered and distributed meat. He expanded the boundaries of his firm to include 
the functions of  shipping and storing dressed meat, that is, to include all the 
transaction-specific capital. Instead of trying to buy refrigerated freight ser- 
vices from the railroads, he built and operated his own freight cars. Instead of 
hiring a firm to use these cars to distribute his meat, he included a distribution 
function within his firm. Instead of relying on the market to buy ice for his 
refrigerated cars, he built ice stations along the way.33 
This last, apparently minor, detail of  Swift’s operation exposes the point 
clearly. Ice, after all, does not seem to possess the qualities listed above to 
make an asset transaction-specific. But Swift could not rely on independent 
suppliers to provide ice at the time and place he needed. And the cost to him 
32. It may strike the reader that the passive voice here suppresses the detail of  what might be an 
interesting historical process. But our interest lies in the use of the innovation, not its genesis. 
33. One might well ask why Swift did not buy the railroads. Efficiently operated railroads had 
other valuable uses, and we imagine the purchase cost and the costs of operating such a diversified 
enterprise would have been greater than the benefits in question here. 25  Business History and Recent Economic Theory 
of  being without ice at that time and place was very great. It was not just the 
cost of any spoiled meat, but also the damage to the nascent market for his 
meat from a shortage of supply or a shipment of spoiled meat. Swift could be 
held up by the owner of an icehouse who had the only ice in the neighborhood. 
Swift avoided  this  potential  conflict  by  expanding his firm  to the point at 
which he incorporated all the assets specific to his central a~tivity.)~ 
The refrigerated  cars were specialized  capital goods. The degree of their 
specialization gave them a great deal of transaction specificity. They illustrate 
the effect of  asset specificity in a dedicated use. An icehouse could be located 
anywhere. But once it was cited, it became specific to the users in that loca- 
tion. Given a single large user like Swift, the potential for hold-ups was great. 
As Chandler has written, “the refrigerator  car . . . was not the reason Swift 
became  the innovator  in  high-volume, year-round  production  of  perishable 
products”  (1977, 299). Swift was a successful pioneer, Chandler writes, be- 
cause he expanded strategically the operations of his meat-packing firm. 
A recent episode may balance the historical account of Swift. The issue in 
this case was disintegration rather than expansion. As before, the choice was 
where to draw the boundaries of  an enterprise, but now within the preexisting 
boundaries of the firm. 
The example concerns the choices made by Charles Brown and the top ad- 
ministration of  AT&T on the eve of the agreement to dismantle the Bell Sys- 
tem. These men were thinking about the optimal configuration of their firm. 
They had to make an explicit choice because the historical boundaries of the 
company were no longer politically viable. AT&T was just too big. The firm’s 
leadership  therefore found itself  in late  198  1 under considerable  pressure to 
decide which of several downsizing alternatives would be best for the firm.35 
AT&T in  1981 was both an operating and a holding company.  It provided 
long-distance  telephone service directly through  its Long Lines department. 
It owned the Bell operating companies (BOCs) that furnished local telephone 
service. It also owned Western Electric, which manufactured equipment used 
by AT&T and the BOCs, anid  Bell Labs, which supplied research and devel- 
opment (R&D) to Western Electric and the Bell System. 
The managers’ alternatives quickly came down to two. A “horizontal” di- 
vestiture would keep AT&T and the upstream Western Electric and Bell Labs 
together but sever the (horizontal) relationship between AT&T and the BOCs. 
A “vertical”  divestiture  would spin off  Western  Electric and Bell Labs from 
the providers of  telephone service, AT&T and the BOCs. The government in 
an earlier antitrust suit against Western  Electric had tried to effect a vertical 
divestiture.  The suit had been resolved by the  1956 consent decree that left 
AT&T’s structure intact but forced Western Electric to freely license its tech- 
nology. AT&T’s leadership feared in 1981 that Judge Harold H. Greene, who 
34. See Kujovich (1970). Yates (1986) would term the ice time-specific as well as location- 
35. On all of this, see Temin (1987). 
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would decide the antitrust case then coming to a close, was sympathetic to the 
goals of the earlier suit. They resolved to make the choice themselves first. 
AT&T’s vertical integration dated from the early 1880s, the same time as 
Swift’s. AT&T’s market position was based on its patents on telephone sets. 
It needed a supply of  telephones in order to extend its market  and to earn 
revenue. Bell tried initially to license manufacturers, but this system broke 
down quickly as the interests of  Bell and the manufacturers diverged. Once 
having  tooled  up  to  produce telephones,  the  manufacturers wanted  to  cut 
prices, expand, and sell to everyone. 
These manufacturing plants had  acquired transaction-specific assets as a 
result of their dedication to manufacturing for a sole purchaser. Initially gen- 
eral manufacturers, they came into a position of bilateral monopoly with Bell 
as a result of  acquiring licenses and specialized technology. The result was 
conflict, bargaining, and nonadherence to the license agreements. AT&T de- 
cided that  it  would  be  cheaper to have direct control over the transaction- 
specific manufacturing assets. It acquired Western Electric and made it the 
sole source of supply for the Bell System (see Smith 1985). 
AT&T’s horizontal structure had evolved in the early years of the twentieth 
century in response to the transaction specificity of  telephone equipment in 
use. Telephones and telephone switchboards, after all, are used for communi- 
cating with other telephones and switchboards. Midwestern companies kept 
installing party lines because they were initially cheaper, even though AT&T 
was trying to set uniform standards and phase out party lines. Improvements 
in telephone systems were not adopted uniformly. AT&T’s management there- 
fore decided to go to a system of wholly owned subsidiaries in order to avoid 
these problems of partial integration with asset specificity. Like the employers 
of men around 1900, they found that a long-term arrangement minimized the 
cost of control (Garnet 1985; Lipartitio 1989). 
These transaction specificities were still present in 198  1. Local telephone 
companies still interfaced with each other and Long Lines. Western Electric 
still made all the equipment they used, while Bell Labs had since the interwar 
period provided the Bell System’s R&D. Which putative markets could work 
the best? 
AT&T’s management had little doubt that the market for telephone equip- 
ment could not work well. If Western Electric was to become a separate com- 
pany,  the  old  problems of  patent  control  and  uncertain  supply would  re- 
emerge. The R&D done by Bell Labs was highly specific to the manufacturing 
done at Western Electric. The managers thought that a future AT&T depen- 
dent on the market for its equipment would be at a competitive disadvantage. 
They thought  they  needed  to control their supply  in order to continuously 
adapt to changing needs. In contrast, they reasoned that the problems of asset 
specificity in the telephone network had decreased as a result of both the es- 
tablishment of a uniform technology and installed equipment base and by the 
growth of regulation. 
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AT&T’s  management was probably not economically optimal. Many firms 
were already manufacturing telephone equipment in the  1970s. AT&T’s pat- 
ents had been licensed under the 1956 consent decree, and large parts of the 
market for equipment had been opened up by Federal Communications Com- 
mission  (FCC) actions.  In  addition,  the technology of  telecommunications 
was undergoing a radical transformation. The electromechanical switches that 
had  been the basis of  Western Electric’s success were being phased out in 
favor of electronic switches, and metallic cables were being replaced by fiber 
optics. Western Electric had been slow to enter the world of digital electronic 
switches in the 1970s. It is not clear that the Western Electric assets had much 
useful transaction specificity left by  1981  .36 
Turning to AT&T’s horizontal integration, the process of divesting revealed 
clearly the transaction specificity of telephone switches. In fact, it became a 
make-or-break issue in  the negotiations for divestiture. The Department of 
Justice was worried that the switches interfacing local and long-distance calls 
were too specific to AT&T’s operations and would impose additional costs on 
Long Lines’ competitors. It took a flurry of  last-minute bargaining to work 
out a solution that would not allow the divested AT&T to benefit from the 
transaction specificity of  the earlier investments. AT&T took a multibillion 
dollar write-off shortly after divestiture to pay for the cost of disentangling the 
human and physical capital of the Bell System (Tunstall 1985). 
This surely is a paradox. The theory of transaction-specific assets indicates 
a clear choice for a vertical divestiture. Yet  Brown and the other managers of 
AT&T never spent time even considering it. They were so convinced of the 
opposite that  they  never even  studied the choice.  Their strong conviction 
therefore cries out for an explanation. 
AT&T’s leaders thought the costs of  horizontal divestiture were worth in- 
curring for three reasons,  As we  have said already, they overestimated the 
asset specificity in Western Electric. They looked back at the historical source 
of  their electromechanical equipment, rather than to future supplies of  elec- 
tronic fixtures. They also relied on continuing regulation of the BOCs to pre- 
vent the exercise of monopoly power by the local exchange carriers. And they 
had by  1981 to consider the political as well as the economic implications of 
any agreement. Relinquishing Western Electric would have reduced AT&T’s 
size only by one-fifth; spinning off the BOCs reduced it by two-thirds. Having 
politicized the discussion of the firm by introducing a well-publicized but ill- 
fated bill into Congress, AT&T’s leadership was forced to take dramatic ac- 
tion to head off drastic legislative action. 
The concept of  transaction specificity is a useful tool for the analysis of 
36. Bell Labs’ assets were more specific to AT&T’s needs, and AT&T’s managements were 
concerned to maintain their R&D edge. They argued that Bell Labs without Western Electric could 
not function. This is a harder argument to evaluate because the process of R&D is largely hidden 
from view. But the steady flow of significant telecommunications innovations from small compa- 
nies supports the inference that here too AT&T management overestimated the amount of  trans- 
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business decisions about the extent of firms, but it has its limitations. It pro- 
vides a framework within which to ask questions about the effects of costly 
information. It directs attention to conditions where divergent  interests can 
impose costs on operations. It provides  a way to generalize the questions of 
control and motivation from individuals to organizational business units. 
But how should we react when the theory predicts one kind of  institutional 
arrangement, and historical managers choose another? Like the other concepts 
described here, the transaction  specificity of key assets cannot predict busi- 
ness history, even though it has some predictive power at the industry level. 
In any individual case, it is not the only factor. It often is an important one, 
however, in the history of large and complex firms. And when, as in the case 
of AT&T, managers go against the tide of transaction  specificity, the theory 
suggests either that noneconomic or nonrational considerations are involved. 
In the case of divestiture, other factors can easily be identified. They were the 
congressional bill to tighten regulation of AT&T that was in a horse race with 
the  antitrust  case to break  the company up  and nostalgia  for the electro- 
mechanical  past  in  which  Western Electric  was the centerpiece of  AT&T’s 
patent monopoly and then system integration. 
The problems of control seen in the principal-agent relationship at the indi- 
vidual level have reemerged at the business  unit  level. The problems of re- 
porting and investment that were at issue with individuals are equally difficult 
at the activity or plant level. We have in this section turned our attention from 
the design of arrangements for control discussed in section 1.2 to the question 
of whether to seek or maintain control at all. These questions are intimately 
related.  For only if the incentives are appropriate  at the individual level will 
economies of integration appear, as Campeau discovered when his divisions 
resisted his attempts to integrate their operations. And only if there are trans- 
action-specific assets will it be worthwhile to design complex solutions to the 
principal-agent problem, as Sloan understood. 
1.4  Relationships with Entire Enterprises 
Having progressed from individuals to business units, it is time to go to the 
firm as a whole. Up to now,  managers  have been  the principals  who were 
analogous to Marshall’s landowner. They had to deal with their agents, em- 
ployees, or subordinate managers. Now, when the whole firm is in view, man- 
agers become the agents of the suppliers of  capital. These suppliers may be 
owners who possess equity in companies, or they may be renters who lend 
money to firms, that is, bondholders. 
The questions here are the same as before. Will principals choose to employ 
agents? If  so, how  will  the principals  motivate  their agents? What kind  of 
financial arrangements can reduce the costs of  the interaction  between  the 
principals  and agents? And, for business historians,  how can managers get 
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The analysis of industrial finance in the last generation has been dominated 
by the Modigliani-Miller theorem asserting that the value of a firm should be 
independent  of  the  structure  of  its  financial   commitment^.^^  The  basic 
Modigliani-Miller argument, which is related to one we invoked in a heuristic 
way above, was that different financial structures would indeed influence the 
riskiness of the firm’s shares, but that investors cared about the riskiness of 
their  overall  portfolio  rather  than  that  of  the  individual  underlying  assets. 
They could achieve whatever level of overall risk they wanted by undertaking 
the  appropriate  borrowing  and portfolio  diversification.  In doing this, they 
could in effect undo any unwanted risk taken on by individual firms’ manag- 
ers. Thus the mix of securities issued by a firm would not matter for its value: 
increased idiosyncratic  riskiness  would not make  investors  pay  less for the 
The assumptions behind this argument paralleled the common assumptions 
about competition more generally in the old-style microeconomic theory. Just 
as ignorance was ruled out in  ordinary  trades,  bankruptcy-the  inability to 
make transactions that resolve conflicts without bringing in third parties-was 
ruled out here. There was no risk of discontinuous losses. And assets were all 
traded on markets big enough for the price to be independent of the actions of 
any individual.  There were no new and untried financial instruments.  There 
was no private placement. There were no transactions large enough to convey 
information about the transactors’ financial positions and needs. 
In many times and places, however, such radical assumptions seem very far 
from relevance. The availability of many publicly traded financial instruments 
is a twentieth-century phenomenon. And even now, financial transactions can 
involve new  securities or risk bankruptcy.  Under these conditions, financial 
structure affects behavior. 
The giant merger wave at the turn of the twentieth century offers a case in 
point. Many factors determined the timing and incidence of the mergers. The 
growth of vertically integrated firms discussed above in the context of  Swift 
was one influence.  The effect of the depression of  the  1890s on firms with 
large  fixed capital  stocks was another.  And  a dramatic  change  in  financial 
markets was a third.  39 
Prior to the late  1890s, the market for industrial securities was very  thin 
indeed.40 Railroads  had  been  able to  borrow  by  means  of  publicly  traded 
bonds and, to a lesser extent, equity. The markets for these securities were 
well established.  Governments traditionally had borrowed by means of nego- 
tiable bonds, and utilities possessed a quasi-governmental character.  English 
utilities had raised money through organized capital markets. But the situation 
37. Modigliani and Miller (1958).  There are, of course, assumptions. 
38. This works only for uncorrelated risks. The investor cannot diversify away “systematic 
39. See Chandler (1977), Lamoreaux (1985), and Navin and Sears (1955). 
40. For more detail in this vein, see Baskin (1988). 
risk” that affects all assets at once. See Brealy and Myers (1988). 30  Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin 
for private enterprise was much more strained. The placements were entirely 
private. The securities were not really traded on a market. There was  real 
negotiation over the supply and use of resources. 
The late 1890s saw the rise of a public market in industrial securities. This 
amounted to the invention of financial instruments and informational environ- 
ments to deal with the incentive problems. Private placements were still re- 
quired to place the bonds initially. But after that, relatively free trading ob- 
tained. 
This expanded capital market drew on more participants and more money 
than the nineteenth-century arrangements it replaced. But it did not make all 
financial transactions like the purchase of a commodity like wheat. Whenever 
transactions were large in scale relative to the operating cash needs of the firm 
raising capital, more traditional problems arose. In  a world in which bank- 
ruptcy was possible-if  not to say likely-investors  wanted to have more 
information before committing their funds. 
The parallel is with Swift’s icehouse. Initially a general-purpose asset,  it 
became transaction-specific by  virtue of  where it was  located and when its 
services were needed. So too with capital. Initially fully fungible, if a loan or 
stock purchase is to provide a major part of the capital for a firm, the capital 
becomes more specific to this transaction. 
Once the capital is committed, the lender and borrower or investor and 
manager are in the position of bilateral monopoly characteristic of transaction- 
specific assets. The agent has acquired capital; she now has every incentive to 
run off with it, that is, to use it for her benefit, not the investor’s. The principal 
therefore has a need to monitor the agent’s actions, to make sure that the funds 
are used to best advantage. The agent is in the position Sloan’s managers in 
charge of GM’s divisions. 
In  the midst of  the  1920 stock market crisis, it emerged that William C. 
Durant had been secretly buying GM stock on the market to prop the price up. 
Durant  had  been  buying  on margin  from a large number of  stockbrokers. 
Given a recent steady decline in GM’s share price and in share prices gener- 
ally,  he  had  become  impossibly overextended.  If  Durant  defaulted on  his 
loans, as seemed quite likely, the brokers would dump the shares they held as 
collateral on the market. The blocks of  stock in question were large, and the 
market was already skittish. Such a sale would surely make raising funds for 
GM capital investment programs more difficult. 
In  his capacity as head of  GM, Durant was  supposed to be acting as an 
agent for the owners of GM stock, his principals. He maintained that he was 
buying stock to protect the financial interests of friends who had invested in 
the shares on his recommendation and thus in the interests of  all GM share- 
holders generally. The Du  Pont group, on the other hand, suspected that he 
was merely trying to prop up the value of collateral for other investments- 
speculative investments-that  he had made. They therefore felt that he had 
pursued his own objectives opportunistically in exactly the selfish way  that 
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lowed. Durant was acting on his own account, not that of GM’s shareholders. 
He was in effect using GM’s assets to bolster his personal position, not the 
firm’s. 
The Du Pont group was a principal that had found the existing arrangement 
to be inadequate to protect it from the opportunities created by  transaction- 
specific assets. The positions in GM and its stock were transaction-specific by 
virtue of their size, that is, by  virtue of Du Pont’s large holdings of stock and 
Durant’s pivotal place at the top of the GM’s management. Durant’s and the 
Du  Pont interest’s transactions were too large relative to the size of GM for 
the market to absorb either of them without effect. 
Durant appealed to the Du Pont group for help in his distress. They were 
willing to bail him out to protect themselves, but unwilling to allow the re- 
creation of  the opportunity Durant had just exploited. They felt his secrecy 
and evasions regarding personal financial matters were of  a piece with his 
reluctance to share or even regularly generate financial and operating statistics 
about the firm. They therefore performed in this market the equivalent of ver- 
tical integration. They bought Durant out and took control of GM. 
By the 1980s, the market for institutional securities was performing some- 
what better. Robert Campeau could raise the money for his 1986 acquisition 
on relatively competitive terms. But in 1989 when the Christmas crisis struck, 
he was not an anonymous transactor but conspicuously in distress. The market 
failed again. Almost a hundred years after the birth of the market for corporate 
securities, with the Dow  wire, vast statistical databases, and powerful per- 
sonal computers sitting on  every financial analyst’s desk,  the  market  still 
would not buy Campeau’s bonds. Campeau did not need much money. But he 
needed it very soon, and all the world knew it (see Raff  and Salmon manu- 
script, fig. 2). He could not raise cash from real estate sale-leasebacks because 
potential buyers knew who would have to find the money to pay the lease. 
Campeau’s very fund-raising transaction told everyone about the corporation’s 
financial position and its riskiness. 
In  a transaction startlingly similar to Durant’s seventy years earlier, Cam- 
peau turned to some of his friends. He sold a controlling interest in his firm to 
Olympia and York, another Canadian real estate firm. Like Durant, Campeau 
found that a private placemenl offered advantage (a higher price based on the 
more detailed knowledge) not present in  a market transaction. Like the Du 
Pont executives, Olympia and York did not want to allow Campeau the liberty 
of going off and making further mistakes. 
But even the infusion of capital from Olympia and York proved insufficient 
to maintain the Campeau firm. Soon after Christmas, rumors began to fly that 
various department stores were up for sale (New York Times, passim). Unlike 
GM, where a change of  leadership revived an economically sound organiza- 
tion, Campeau’s firm had outgrown its economic limits. It had expanded be- 
yond the point where the gains from internal operations outweighed the costs 
of  acquisition and integration. The constraints imposed by  the capital mar- 
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cash it needed for ordinary operations-did  not allow time for the anticipated 
cost  savings from integrated  operations to be  realized.  However  beneficial 
these economies would be in a steady state, the investment seemed to be too 
risky in the current financial conditions. Campeau had gone well over the line. 
The creditors did not trust him and did not wish to throw good money after 
bad. Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings were initiated in February 1990. 
Decisions at this third level are symmetrical to those at the preceding two. 
Principals have trouble directing agents to do their bidding equally at the farm 
level observed by Marshall and at the firm level in GM. And the question of 
hiring and firing, of integrating or not, is mirrored by the question of financing 
or not. Only when there is mutual advantage will a bargain be struck. But, as 
these examples show all too clearly, advantage appears only dimly in a com- 
plex and changing world. Information is costly and hard to find at all levels. 
Who knows what and when is a crucial element in the structure of  relation- 
ships and deals. 
1.5  Conclusion 
The traditional  economics of  industry  assumed that  most  industries, and 
more broadly most economic exchanges, were competitive. Two assumptions 
were therefore  central in  analyses. First, knowledge  was possessed  by  all. 
Second, no one actor was important enough to affect the price of  any transac- 
tion.  Under  these  circumstances,  decision-makers  would  be  indifferent 
whether they participated  in any particular  activity. Activities would be cho- 
sen even if they were only marginally  more rewarding than the alternatives. 
The pay for working would be almost the same in any job as in the next best 
alternative.  The price paid for any asset would  be the same price that many 
other people  would be willing to pay. The interest rate for loans to different 
borrowers would be essentially uniform. There would be no agency problem 
of  any form. 
The recent economic theory of  industry and firms has turned its attention to 
conditions of  imperfect  information  and  limited  competition. Attention  has 
thus turned to those conditions where the two assumptions of the traditional 
theory are not satisfied. Knowledge is assumed to be partial and costly. Situa- 
tions arise in which a few individuals struggle for control. It therefore matters 
for the outcome and structure of these transactions who knows what. Particu- 
lar structures of information may induce inefficiencies and gross distortions. 
Agency theories have suggested certain ways out of the dilemmas and bur- 
dens threatened by these empirically ubiquitous conditions, and new empiri- 
cal work has successfully tested the relevance of these theories in a variety of 
contexts. The examples presented  here show how the basic, underlying rea- 
soning  can  be  used  to give  explanations in business history.  The theories, 
based as the are on profit maximization, are prescriptive as well as descriptive. 
They always provide a cogent, systematic set of questions. They often provide 
a standard  against  which  to evaluate actions. They sometimes suggest out- 33  Business History and Recent Economic Theory 
comes that do not at first seem likely or may not even have happened. Either 
situation provides food for further, focused thought. 
The theories ought, therefore, to be useful to business historians. It is our 
hope as well that the stories business historians tell will stimulate economists 
to rethink and extend their theories. When the existing theories do not predict 
well, this may indicate that the theory needs amendment. When the choices 
of business people cannot be subsumed under a well-formulated case, there is 
an opportunity to extend theories. 
Historians are good at empathy. Economics can supply a little fruitful alien- 
ation. The best relationships have a little tension in them.41  Business history 
and economic theory can learn from and enhance one another. 
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Comment  David A. Hounshell 
In their paper,  Daniel Raff  and Peter Temin offer us a lively and elegantly 
argued statement on the relevance of  newer economic theory to the study of 
business history. Both the economist and the business historian will find much 
in their paper to contemplate. 
In spite of providing us with a brief but cogent sketch of  the two dominant 
approaches to economic thought-English  deductionism and German induc- 
tionism-Raff  and Temin have short-shrifted their readers in not developing a 
fuller account of how both economists’ and business historians’ understanding 
of  the firm has changed in the last three to five decades. For example, they 
argue at the outset that traditional economic theory’s treatment of  the firm has 
been of limited use to business people and business historians. But one should 
not assume that business historians paid no heed to economic thought,  be- 
cause many business historians worked quite diligently  to write firm-based 
business history that was consistent with or shaped by the evolving theory of 
the firm-theory  to which economists contributed all along. Nor do Raff and 
Temin lay out how economists contemplating both firm and larger economic 
behavior responded to the work of  business historians in their derivation of 
the new economic theory that Raff and Temin argue is so valuable to business 
historians. 
Perhaps Raff and Temin believe such a developmental history of these two 
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fields is unnecessary given  that  such  an  economist as Oliver Williamson, 
whose work figures heavily in their analysis, has written on the historical de- 
velopment of  the new economic theory in both his Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism and  the  autobiographical sketch he  included  in  his  collection 
of essays, Economic  Organization, and given Thomas McCraw’s portrait of 
business historian Alfred  D. Chandler Jr.3 evolving scholarship first pub- 
lished in Reviews  in American History  and later introducing The Essential 
Alfred Chandler.‘ But I, for one, would have liked to have seen the authors 
include a much fuller section on how these two fields have developed to the 
point where they can pronounce the new economic theory of  great utility to 
business historians and, presumably, vice versa. 
If I read Raff and Temin correctly, the basis of the new theory they advocate 
stems from George Stigler’s classic paper of  1961, “The Economics of Infor- 
mation,” and the body of works that followed from it. These works rejected 
older economic theory with its assumptions that knowledge was essentially a 
free good, that most industries were competitive, and that no single actor was 
big  enough  to  affect the price of  any transaction.  Information,  like other 
goods, is costly, and how  much one has of  it has definite consequences for 
decision making. Raff and Temin seek in their paper to draw out more explic- 
itly the useful and critical connections among the Williamsonian theory of 
the  firm,  Stiglerian economics of  imperfect information,  and  Marshallian- 
inspired agency theory and, in their words, “to suggest . . . a set of concepts 
business historians might use to organize their data.” 
They do so by illustrating three levels of managerial decisions: “organizing 
the work of individuals ,” “organizing whole production units ,” and “organiz- 
ing finance to pay for the enterprise.” Within each of these three areas of man- 
agerial activity, Raff and Temin use specific historical episodes to demonstrate 
the utility  to  business  historians of  the  concepts  from the  new  economic 
theory. Raff  and Temin’s articulation of  agency theory is extremely helpful, 
but it also poses some problems. The authors argue that a “single logic” gov- 
ems principal-agent relations at all three levels of managerial decision making 
within the firm. Agency theory suggests that the major problem is for the 
principal to devise incentives and controls to ensure that agents serve com- 
pletely or “maximize” the interests of the principal rather than serving their 
own interests to the detriment of their principal’s interests. The ideal scheme 
is, of  course, to structure principal-agent relations, systems of controls, and 
incentives such that the interests of both principal and agent are maximized. 
1.  Oliver E. Williamson,  The Economic Insrifufions of  Capitalism (New York: Free  Press, 
1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Organization: Firms, Markers, and Policy Conrrol (New 
York: New York University Press,  1986), xi-xviii;  Thomas McCraw, “The Challenge of  Alfred 
D. Chandler,” Reviews in American Hisfory 14( 1986): 160-78; Thomas McCraw, ed.,  The Essen- 
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But indeed such a set of conditions rarely exists, and the past is replete with 
cases in which principals maximized their own interests while not protecting 
those  of  their  agents (some would  call  such  instances “exploitation”) and 
where agents put their own interests above that of their principals (Raff  and 
Temin call this “shirking”). The critical question for me  is, speaking as  a 
historian, what is the ultimate utility of determining whether someone in the 
past exploited or shirked in a relationship? 
What is most problematic about the employment of  agency theory, either 
by  the economist or the historian, is establishing an appropriate time frame 
for analysis. In one of the most frequently cited articles ever published in the 
Harvard Business Review (58 [1980]: 67-77),  “Managing Our Way  to Eco- 
nomic Decline,” Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy charged that cor- 
porate managers were making decisions to maximize profits in the short run- 
that is, for the next quarterly report-rather  than taking a longer-run view and 
pursuing long-term objectives for growth and return on investment. The phe- 
nomenon  Hayes  and  Abemathy  observed could be  explained easily using 
agency theory.  But  so what? Beyond  allowing the scholar to  say whether 
shirking, exploitation, or optimization has occurred, does the analysis help us 
answer the questions of  why and how? If  Thomas Johnson (chap. 2 in this 
volume) is correct that inappropriate accounting rules have led to short-run 
maximization in the United States, can agency theory tell us why this hap- 
pened here and how? For this historian, at least, the new economic theory 
does not go far enough in explaining what aesthetic, cultural, psychological, 
and  other factors come into play  when managers,  in the face of  imperfect 
information, pursue particular strategies in managing their workers and their 
nonhuman assets. In other words, I am frankly skeptical of  a “single logic” 
adequately accounting for or guiding decisions at all levels of the firm. 
In particular, the analysis in Raff  and Temin’s paper ignores one very im- 
portant area of enterprise altogether-in  shorthand, Schumpeterian econom- 
ics. One of the critical aspects of managerial activity surely must be deciding 
what to produce. Such decision making is part of the larger area of  entrepre- 
neurship, which is not addressed in this paper. Marshall’s (and, indeed, Raff’s 
and Temin’s) assumption that all farmers are equal is essentially a statement 
that rules out the possibility of  innovation and entrepreneurship, phenomena 
that have played a major role in the history of business. 
Raff  and Temin discuss relationships with groups and devote considerable 
discussion to horizontal boundaries. Here is where most of my  responses to 
the paper lie. The authors provide an explication of  GM’s divisionalization. 
Such a reorganization produced what might be thought of as an internal capital 
market, made possible by the establishment of a common scale for the evalu- 
ation of  economic performance across divisions. Despite their earlier recog- 
nition that information is costly and not perfect, their account here assumes 
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tory is literally full of instances in which the multidivisional firm did not op- 
erate in the way Chandler and Williamson  would have it. I cite but two ex- 
amples. 
Raff  and  Temin  might  consider Du  Pont’s New  Venture Program of  the 
1960s, which  is discussed  at length in the study I published  with John K. 
Smith.2 Here is an instance in which, despite the company’s possession  of 
return-on-investment  tools, Du Pont’s executives  had absolutely  no rational 
way for allocating capital because they did not possess the kind of information 
necessary to make sound judgments across the firm’s divisions. The very idea 
of an effective internal capital market within a decentralized firm such as Du 
Pont or GM presupposes better information than perhaps really exists in such 
firms.  Decision  making, therefore, must  be  made on some other grounds. 
What might those grounds be? 
The authors might also ponder transfer pricing deficiencies.  In Du Pont in 
the  1940s and  1950s, some departments selling  chemical intermediates to 
other departments kept two sets of books, the “official books” by which trans- 
fer prices were negotiated and the “real books” by which division heads made 
decisions affecting their division’s overall allocation of resources. Within the 
multidivisional,  diversified firm, there has been continual difficulty in assess- 
ing Du Pont intermediates’ performance because some intermediates are not 
available on the open market, because those that are available are sometimes 
not perfect substitutes, and because when market-obtained  intermediates are 
available (and, therefore, a market price is valid), executives have been un- 
willing to discount potential improvements to intermediate products and pro- 
cesses that might come from R&D pursued by  those divisions selling the in- 
termediates.i  This  last  point  is  related  to  the  authors’  discussion-and 
Williamson’s analysis-of  asset specificity. 
Raff and Temin explore the question of why the du Ponts did not break up 
GM. Here the record is pretty clear-at  least to me. First, Pierre du Pont and 
John Jacob Raskob viewed  the automobile industry  as the major growth in- 
dustry of their period. They believed  the industry was a promising outlet for 
their hoard of cash earned from World War I explosives sales. The Du Pont 
Company itself was investing some of  this money to diversify the firm away 
from explosives, and the architects of  the strategy had identified the automo- 
bile industry as a major market for the company’s new products (paints, lac- 
quers, plastics, artificial fibers, artificial leather, fuel additives, etc.). By buy- 
ing into GM, Du Pont could obtain a captive market (or so the Du Pont people 
initially believed and so charged the Justice Department  in the antitrust case 
that eventually forced Du Pont to divest its GM holdings). In reality, the au- 
tomotive markets were indeed huge and proved to be critical for the growth 
and performance of Du Pont in the 1920s and 1930s. 
2. David  A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont 
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Finally, GM is not an example of perfect horizontal combination. That is, 
not all GM units or divisions are identical. GM’s divisions, one could argue, 
were producing different products; a Chevy is not a Cadillac. In fact, this point 
becomes all the more clear after the du Ponts came into the picture and forced 
Durant out. Sloan’s policy of a car for every purpose and purse, the rethinking 
of the Chevrolet Division in the 1920s (which lead in 1927 to Chevy blowing 
the Model T out of the market), and the creation of the Pontiac Division to fill 
a void in the segmented market, all provide testimony to GM’s and Du Pont’s 
long-term investment strategy, their recognition of  multiple markets within 
the automobile industry, and their belief in economies of both scale and scope. 
Finally, one must remember that GM was also characterized by its verticality, 
which the authors do not address in any detail in this section of the paper. 
The authors also discuss the vertical boundaries of  the firm and emphasize 
the concept of transaction or asset specificity, although they play down one of 
the four kinds of asset specificity articulated by  William~on,~  namely human 
asset specificity. One of  Du  Pont’s major weaknesses in developing a phar- 
maceuticals business has been its lack of  know-how in getting compounds 
cleared through the regulatoryklearance  maze.  The recently announced Du 
Pont-Merck  pharmaceuticals joint venture was made in large part because Du 
Pont needed Merck’s experience with  Food  and  Drug Administration and 
other regulatory-body clearance procedures in order to get some very promis- 
ing compounds into the market. 
I want to suggest an alternative explanation for the manner in which AT&T 
divested, emphasizing similar human asset specificity. I believe AT&T exec- 
utives saw transaction specificity not in the way interpreted by Raff and Temin 
but by their assessment of Western Electric’s expertise and capabilities-ca- 
pabilities they did not believe could be easily secured in the marketplace or 
grown anew. Here I refer to development capabilities, which are in many ways 
more critical to successful technological innovation than Nobel-prize-caliber 
research. The success of Bell Labs as an institution rested as much on its and 
Western Electric’s development capabilities as it did on its research per se. 
The authors discount far too heavily the perceived value of Western Electric 
in the minds of  AT&T executives. 
Unlike Hayes and Abernathy  ’s typical managers, AT&T’s executives were 
seeking long-term goals when they charted how they would carve up the pie. 
They sought entry into new information-processing markets (integrated infor- 
mation processing in particular), which made Western Electric and Bell Labs 
appear to be transaction-specific and therefore governed their strategy to di- 
vest horizontally rather than vertically. On a short-term basis,  this type of 
divestment might have been nonoptimal, but Brown et al. were not thinking 
short-term. They were looking long-term and working in an entrepreneurial 
4. Williamson, Economic Instirutions of  Capitalism. 
5.  Hounshell and Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy, 464-13. 40  Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin 
mode  that,  as  I  noted  earlier,  is  not  accommodated in  the new  economic 
theory, as presented by Raff and Temin. Divestment vertically would have left 
them, I believe,  with fewer long-term development capabilities in areas they 
perceived as having high potential for growth. 
Raff and Temin’s assessment of  AT&T’s divestiture raises the fundamental 
question about the ultimate goals of  the economist and the historian.  If eco- 
nomic  theory  suggests that  a  company or an executive did  not  maximize 
profit,  what  should  be  our response as historians  and economists? Here, I 
believe, the goals of economists and historians diverge. Raff and Temin sug- 
gest that the historian  is merely a teller of  stories, a suggestion that grossly 
underrates what historians do. In interpreting the past, the historian seeks to 
understand and to explain, not just to tell a story and certainly not to castigate 
or to correct. The historian is prone to pay special attention to the particulari- 
ties of  past events and to the context in which  they occurred. But the best 
historians are also interested in drawing generalizations from the events of the 
past. Gauging by Raff  and Temin’s paper, the economist seeks to test current 
theories on the past and sometimes to test the past as interpreted by historians 
with current theories. In some instances the economist seeks to expose and to 
rectify the past. 
Business historians  and economists have made substantial progress  in the 
last few decades by looking at each other’s work. If this conference serves the 
purpose of  opening a more formal dialogue between the two disciplines, so 
much the better. Yet  we must recognize that our ultimate goals might, in fact, 
be different. 